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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Dynamic capabilities remain one of the most popular, but also one of the most controver-
sial  topics in current knowledge and innovation research. This study exposes strengths and
weaknesses of existing conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities by using a systems theo-
retic lens. Systems theory suggests that organizations operate in environments they cannot
fully  understand. Thus, organizational action patterns inevitably involve simpliﬁcation,
selectivity and uncertainty leading to inherent blind spots in every kind of strategic action.
As  the resulting insight, fully ﬂexible organizational capabilities might not be achievable
and  continuous adaptation to every kind of environmental change cannot be possible from
a  systems theoretic perspective. Accordingly, this work discusses empirical difﬁculties that
derive from the preceding argumentation and outlines a corresponding re-conceptualization
of  the dynamic capabilities concept.
©  2016 Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Las capacidades dinámicas siguen siendo una de las más populares, pero también uno de los
temas más  controversiales en la investigación de conocimiento e innovación. Este estudioalabras clave:
expone las fortalezas y debilidades de las conceptualizaciones existentes de las capacidades
ica teórica de sistemas. La teoría de sistemas sugiere que las organiza-
apacidades dinámicas
dinámicas bajo la ópteoría de sistemas
omplejidad
ciones operan en entornos que no pueden ser comprendidos plenamente. Por lo tanto, los
patrones de acción organizacionales implican, inevitablemente, la simpliﬁcación, la selec-
tividad y la incertidumbre que conllevan a puntos ciegos inherentes a cada tipo de acción
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estratégica. Como percepción resultante, la completa ﬂexibilidad de las capacidades organi-
zacionales podrían no ser alcanzables y la continua adaptación a cualquier tipo de cambio
en  el ambiente no puede ser posible desde una perspectiva teórica de sistemas. En conse-
cuencia, este trabajo analiza las diﬁcultades empíricas que se desprenden del argumento
anterior y esboza una re-conceptualización correspondiente del concepto de capacidades
dinámicas.
©  2016 Journal of Innovation & Knowledge. Publicado por Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. Este es
un  artı´culo Open Access bajo la CC BY-NC-ND licencia (http://creativecommons.org/Introduction
Since the two seminal works by Teece, Pisano, and Shuen
(1997) and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) dynamic capabilities
became and remained a central research area on knowledge
and innovation. Despite the popularity, several shortcomings
still exist, with the fragmentation of the literature being one
example (Arend & Bromiley, 2009). Bibliographic reviews (e.g.
Peteraf, Di Stefano, & Verona, 2013; Vogel & Güttel, 2013)
suggest that various conversations on dynamic capabilities
emerge that, although being partly complementary, do not
necessarily share a common theoretical grounding. The frag-
mentation of the ﬁeld is visible through the diversity in
deﬁnitions and conceptualizations of dynamic capabilities
(Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009).
To divide this variety of conceptualizations into groups,
a classiﬁcation along the lines of a distinctive desirable out-
come, that is successful adaptation to environmental changes
or the achievement of competitive advantage, appears to
be useful. A recent meta-analysis reveals that the empirical
evidence for the relationship between dynamic capabili-
ties and competitive advantage is inconsistent (Pezeshkan,
Fainshmidt, Nair, Lance Frazier, & Markowski, 2015). The ini-
tial intent of Teece et al. (1997) was to explore how ﬁrms can
sustain a competitive advantage in highly dynamic environ-
ments. Accordingly, they conceptualize dynamic capabilities
as leading to ‘sustainable’ success. However, only some of the
existing research today follows this assumption. This paper
therefore divides between conceptualizations that include
a distinct outcome, and those that do not. The group that
argues for a distinctive outcome consists of two further
subgroups, that either argue for sustainability or not. Like
Teece et al. (1997), Wang and Ahmed’s (2007, p. 35) concep-
tualization belongs to the ﬁrst group. They deﬁne dynamic
capabilities as “a ﬁrm’s behavioral orientation constantly to
integrate, reconﬁgure, renew and recreate its resources and
capabilities and, most importantly, upgrade and reconstruct
its core capabilities in response to the changing environment
to attain and sustain competitive advantage”. Further def-
initions that might as well ﬁt here are for example those
by Grifﬁth and Harvey (2001) and Lee, Lee, and Rho (2002).
This study refers to those deﬁnitions in the following as
group 1a.Conceptualizations that slightly relax the assumptions of
competitive advantage, but still contain an outcome com-
ponent belong to the second subgroup, that this study calls
group 1b. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1107) for examplelicencias/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
deﬁne dynamic capabilities as “the ﬁrm’s processes that use
resources – speciﬁcally the processes to integrate, reconﬁgure,
gain and release resources – to match or even create mar-
ket change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational
and strategic routines by which ﬁrms achieve new resources
conﬁgurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and
die”. Contrary to Teece et al.’s (1997) conceptualization and
the resource-based view origins (Barney, 1991) of the con-
cept, it is explicitly stated that dynamic capabilities do not
necessarily meet all of the VRIN criteria, namely being valu-
able, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable. The equiﬁnality
of dynamic capabilities might make them substitutable and
also partly imitable (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). This con-
ceptualization’s violation of the VRIN criteria might not only
impede the achievement of a sustained competitive advan-
tage, but also of a temporary competitive advantage (Peteraf
& Bergen, 2003; Peteraf et al., 2013). Nonetheless, Eisenhardt
and Martin’s (2000) deﬁnition still ties dynamic capabilities to
the achievement of an outcome, namely matching or creat-
ing market change. This at least indirect relation to a positive
outcome (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010) is among
others also identiﬁable in Zollo and Winter’s (2002) and Zahra,
Sapienza, and Davidsson’s (2006) deﬁnition.
Independent of the very type, the involvement of a success-
ful outcome in the deﬁnition of dynamic capabilities might
make the concept tautological (e.g. Ambrosini & Bowman,
2009; Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Williamson, 1999):
“If the ﬁrm has a dynamic capability, it must perform well,
and if the ﬁrm is performing well, it should have a dynamic
capability” (Cepeda & Vera, 2007, p. 427). This directly affects
empirical examinations since cause and effect are insepara-
ble. It becomes for example impossible to declare dynamic
capabilities ex ante (Arend & Bromiley, 2009). Moreover, some
deﬁnitions might not even allow for an ex post declaration.
Rindova and Kotha (2001) argue in their case study research
that Yahoo! and Excite possess dynamic capabilities. However,
both ﬁrms faced signiﬁcant troubles after the ﬁeld research
(Arend & Bromiley, 2009). This might not affect Rindova and
Kotha’s (2001) declaration of dynamic capabilities as they
argue that a competitive advantage cannot be sustainable
in so-called hypercompetitive environments (D’Aveni, 1994).
Thus, the ﬁrms might simply have ‘lost’ their capabilities and
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the possibility of a loss
seems not satisfactory as this implies that a ﬁrm that success-
fully transformed multiply times might not necessarily be able
to repeat this in the future. Thus, the attribution of dynamic
capabilities ex post might not provide insides for future devel-
opments. In order to avoid those challenges, an identiﬁcation
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Table 1 – Deﬁnitions of dynamic capabilities.
Group Deﬁnitions include Examples Advantage Disadvantage
1a Sustainable
advantage as the
outcome
Teece et al. (1997)
Grifﬁth and Harvey
(2001)
Wang and Ahmed (2007)
Explains sustainable
advantage in dynamic
environments and
therefore extends the
resource-based view
Tautology that dynamic
capabilities equal
competitive advantage
1b Achievement of
any outcome
Eisenhardt and Martin
(2000)
Zollo and Winter (2002)
Zahra et al. (2006)
Intent to extend the
resource-based view
partly captured
Tautology that dynamic
capabilities equal a
speciﬁc outcome
2 No outcome Winter (2003) Not tautological Misses the intent of
dynamic capabilities to
explain sustainable
competitive advantage
3 Purpose instead
of an outcome
Helfat et al. (2007) Solves the trade-off
between tautology and
Empirical tests are
controversial (Barreto,
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tf processes with a causal link to resource creation or modiﬁ-
ation, instead of ﬁrm performance, is necessary (Ambrosini
 Bowman, 2009).
There are of course conversations on dynamic capabilities
hat consider the major shortcomings and separate dynamic
apabilities from a positive outcome, this study further refers
o this group as group 2. Arguably, the most prominent
xample here might be Winter (2003). He describes dynamic
apabilities as a higher-order routine to change zero-level
apabilities. Following Winter (2003), dynamic capabilities
re plainly one strategic option available to organizations
n dynamic environments that might not lead to success
t all. Ad-hoc problem solving, or resource- picking skills
Makadok, 2001) could be alternatives. Moreover, in static envi-
onments dynamic capabilities might even have a negative
mpact on ﬁrm performance (Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2011;
inter, 2003).
These conceptualizations neither suffer from tautology,
or from an inability to prove them empirically. However,
hey might miss the very intent of the concept dynamic
apabilities by Teece et al. (1997). The dynamic capability
erspective’s intent to extent the resource-based view that,
lthough efﬁcient in static environments, is less applicable to
xplain sustainable competitive advantage in regimes of rapid
hange. The non-tautological deﬁnitions of group 2 thus miss
he very purpose of dynamic capabilities. Hence, their addi-
ional value might remain limited as various other concepts
lready address ﬂexibility, learning, and change, i.e. ambidex-
erity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991), organizational
earning (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Levitt & March, 1988), change
anagement (Lewin, 1947; Weick & Quinn, 1999), and absorp-
ive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002).
ome argue therefore that dynamic capabilities are ‘vague’
Arend & Bromiley, 2009; Barreto, 2010).
In search for a hybrid, alternative deﬁnitions consider the
xisting controversy. This study refers to those conceptual-
zations as group 3. They soften the assumption of achieving
 distinct outcome and alter their deﬁnitions toward a ‘pur-
oseful’ striving for an outcome. This may circumvent the
oss of the concept’s very intent, while apparently avoiding
he tautology trap. An example here is Helfat et al.’s (2007:1)intention to explain
competitive advantage
2010) Purpose should be
expected
“the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend
or modify its resource base”. Again, those deﬁnitions are
intractable as empirical tests of ‘purpose’, may it be ex ante
or ex post, are controversial (Barreto, 2010). The literature
on dynamic capabilities appears thus subject to a trade-off
between being either a tautological, causally not ascertain-
able in empirical investigations (group 1) or being vague with
limited strategic intent (groups 2 and 3). Table 1 summarizes
the groups of deﬁnitions of dynamic capabilities.
Systems  theory
A starting point for a systems theoretic perspective (Luhmann,
1995) on dynamic capabilities is the fundamental distinction
between a social system, such as an organization, and its envi-
ronment. In very basic terms, a social system is deﬁned as
being everything but the environment and vice versa. This
means that a distinction and thus a border is drawn between
the ‘inside’ (system) and the ‘outside’ (environment). This dis-
tinction is primarily a difference of complexity with a lower
level of complexity inside the system. In other words, the
environment seems to be boundless and inﬁnite from the sys-
tem’s perspective and the latter is unable to comprehend its
surrounding in full scale and scope. Instead, a social system
has to reduce complexity to constitute itself and to ensure
its further existence through establishing and maintaining a
difference or a boundary to its environment. Nevertheless, the
system still needs a sufﬁcient although a lower degree of inter-
nal complexity to cope with challenges of its more complex
environment (Ashby, 1956).
Distinct  characteristics  of  social  systems
The reduction of environmental complexity is accomplishable
through two distinct characteristics of social systems. Draw-
ing on basic insights from modern systems theory (Luhmann,
1995), organizations are regarded as social systems which are
both self-referential and sense-processing in their very nature.
Building on the biological concept of autopoeisis (Maturana
& Varela, 1980), self-referentiality means that a social system
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necessarily refers to itself by distinguishing between the sys-
tem and the environment. Accordingly, the system decides
what counts as the ‘inside’ (system) and the ‘outside’ (environ-
ment) by taking itself as the point of reference within an act
of social construction. Social systems are also sense-processing.
They possess a certain purpose or meaning stemming from its
distinction from the system’s environment that is “they pro-
duce sense and then operate on the basis of having produced
it.” (Moeller, 2011, p. 134).
Sense-processing and self-referentiality are closely inter-
twined: They represent an essentially subjective and self-
descriptive stance resulting in a boundary demarcation that
appears to be meaningful to the system. This ongoing process
of social construction is inevitable and inescapable: Self-
referential and sense-processing practices enable the system
to act in world of inﬁnite opportunities. They support the
selection of a few opportunities that appear to be meaning-
ful to the system while they help to exclude a variety of
other options. In other words, a set of reasonable possibili-
ties for action is chosen at the expense of seemingly inﬁnite
others. Thereby, they reduce overwhelming environmental
complexity to a feasible level from a system’s perspective
(Luhmann, 1995). Moreover, such historically rooted ‘interpre-
tive action patterns’ (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010), sensemaking
‘action schemes’ (Weick, 1979) and self-descriptions resulting
in collective identities (Seidl, 2005) are essential not only to
enable organizational action but also to maintain meaningful
organizational boundaries. They differentiate the system from
its environment since the former would not exist otherwise
(Aldrich, 1971). The maintenance of system borders necessar-
ily implies a preservation of a complexity divide with a lower
level of complexity inside the system.
Selectivity
Since an organization is unable to fully comprehend its bound-
less environment, interpretative practices are in place to
permit the system to act. Thereby, the system is inevitably
selective (Luhmann, 1995) since it pursues only those action
patterns that appear to be meaningful to itself. Consequently,
complexity reduction at the system’s border involves the
inherent risk of developing an inappropriate idea of the orga-
nizational environment. This generic problem of organizing is
ultimately not resolvable. In short, “organization necessitates
selectivity” (Wildavsky, 1983, p. 29). A system has to develop
selective procedures, action patterns, routines, and thus capa-
bilities and competences in order to exist and to act in a
world of inﬁnite possibilities implying environmental com-
plexity (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). Paradoxically, selectivity also
leads to potential blind spots, and to uncertainty in every kind
of strategic action which constrains organizational action and
harms organizational survival.
Blind  spots
Popularized by Porter (1980) as part of the competitor analy-
sis, the contemporary management literature on competitive
blind spots heavily draws on a psychological perspective,
stressing the role of group perception and cognition (e.g.
Ng, Westgren, & Sonka, 2009). In a systems theoretic sense, o w l e d g e 1 (2 0 1 6) 109–116
competitive blind spots represent the necessarily ignorant
nature of strategic action. Since social systems are essen-
tially self-referential they are naïve and uncritical in a certain
way. This applies particularly to their underlying socially
constructed distinctions on which their observations of real-
ity and thus their collective sense and identity build on
(Luhmann, 1995). As generally stated above, selectivity enables
the system to observe its environment in the ﬁrst place but it
also prevents the former from observing itself from an exter-
nal perspective, or as Luhmann (1995, p. xxxiv) puts it:
“Whatever is observed is observed by an observer, who cuts up
reality in a certain way in order to make it observable. Whatever
distinction is selected, others remain possible. Each cut highlights
certain aspects of reality and obscures others. Reality as such,
the unity of the observing system and its environment, the para-
doxical sameness of difference, of inside and outside, remains
inaccessible; it is what “one does not perceive when one perceives
it,” the “blind spot” that enables the system to observe but escapes
observation.”
The only way to reveal system inherent blind spots is
a second-order observation: an external observer provides
another frame of reference (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007)
and enriches the system’s selective perspective. Nevertheless,
like every observation, second-order observations underlie
speciﬁc distinctions that involve their own blind spots. This
consequently reproduces the basic paradox of selective obser-
vations (Luhmann, 1995). Moreover, since social systems are
essentially self-referential they also use corresponding selec-
tion, interpretation, and reaction patterns when coping with
feedback derived from second-order observations.
The following Fig. 1 illustrates the systems-theoretic
conceptualization of the generic system–environment rela-
tionship outlined above. Accordingly, there is a complexity
difference between the system (lower complexity level inside
the dashed circle) and its environment (higher complexity
level outside the dashed circle). The system has to reduce
environmental complexity in order to act and to ensure its fur-
ther existence. Thus it pursues selective and simpliﬁed action
patterns (shaded circles) in an environment of seemingly inﬁ-
nite possibilities for action (blue circles). Blind spots (white
circles) are invisible for the focal system. A second-order-
observation (double-headed arrow) of an external observer
(smaller dashed circle) could enrich the system’s perspective
by revealing such blind spots to a certain extent. Nevertheless,
if action patterns change in consequence of an adaptation of
organizational capabilities, existing blind spots might become
relevant which would lead to the failure of corresponding orga-
nizational action patterns.
Uncertainty
Building on Luhmann’s (1995) idea of complexity, Schreyögg
and Sydow (2010) conclude that environmental complex-
ity implicates uncertainty. Representing an organizational key
problem (Thompson, 1967), the management of uncertainty
through simpliﬁcation opens the possibility for failure. Orga-
nizational action patterns as means to handle uncertainty
could be inadequate: “coping with environmental uncertainty
does not eliminate environmental uncertainty” (Schreyögg
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 Sydow, 2010, p. 1254). In contrast to blind spots, which
hey are not aware of, organizational decision makers per-
eive environmental uncertainty in addition. For instance,
illiken (1987, p. 136) distinguishes three types of perceived
nvironmental uncertainty, each referring to the imperfect
nderstanding of environmental conditions: state uncertainty
not knowing how environmental components might change),
ffect uncertainty (not knowing to which extent environmen-
al changes might affect the organization because it lacks
ufﬁcient knowledge of cause-effect relationships between
omponents), and response uncertainty (not knowing which
ptions might be available to react to environmental changes
s well as to which consequences a certain response option
ight lead).
iscussion  of  the  dilemma  of  the  dynamic
apability  concept
he dynamic capability view runs the risk of getting caught
n an epistemological trap. Deﬁnitions of dynamic capabilities
ccording to whatever kind of outcome-level (group 1) do not
llow for rival explanations (Yin, 2009) of competitive advantage,
lthough competitive advantage is an equiﬁnal construct that
ight have multifaceted causes. Even more  implicit (group
b) deﬁnitions in this respect might face the same problem
o a certain extent, since even ordinary capabilities already
nextricably relate to reliable success (Schreyögg & Kliesch-
berl, 2007) or as Dosi, Nelson, and Winter (2000, p. 2) put it
imilarly:
“To be capable of some thing is to have a generally reliable
capacity to bring that thing about as a result of intended action.
Capabilities ﬁll the gap between intention and outcome, and they
ﬁll it in such a way that the outcome bears a deﬁnite resemblance
to what was intended.”
In short, a capability is present when one intentionally
roves to do something well repeatedly and not only at one environment.
instance. This exposes a basic dilemma of the capability-based
view with respect to its historical roots: A deﬁnition of
dynamic capabilities must add signiﬁcant theoretical surplus
value in comparison to ordinary capabilities to be perceived
as a meaningful extension to concepts originating from the
resource-based perspective. Otherwise it risks being too broad,
arbitrary, or imprecise with respect to related constructs
(group 2). As the term ‘dynamic’ implies, this surplus can
only involve the implicit or explicit tautological notion of an
organizational capability that allows for continuous adapta-
tion, otherwise the ‘dynamic’- addition is either obsolete or
misleading. Similarly, the term capability already implies pur-
poseful or intentional action. Purpose should therefore not serve
as a distinction criterion for ‘dynamic’ capabilities (group 3).
In a broader sense, every strategic action follows a speciﬁc
purpose.
Implications  of  a  systems  theoretic  perspective
The inevitably imperfect understanding that organizations
possess of their environment implies that organizational
action patterns, such as routines, are selective and simplify-
ing in their very nature. The same applies to organizational
capabilities as they consist (although not exclusively) of rout-
ines or even are high level routines themselves (Dosi et al.,
2000; Winter, 2003). Selectivity is the reason why social sys-
tems exist in the ﬁrst place and why they are able to act within
environments they do not fully understand. An organization
cannot escape the inherent selectivity of its action patterns
because of their self-referential nature (Luhmann, 1995). Even
a capability monitoring process by second order observers (e.g.
Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007) cannot facilitate total reﬂex-
ivity because the processing of the second-order observers
feedback is also subject to selectivity. Similarly, such a
‘view from nowhere’ as the notion of an external and neu-
tral observer suggests, seems to be rather unrealistic since
observing involves human actors with certain intentions and
attitudes that are also to some extent part of the focal system
(Schirmer & Tasto, 2009).
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In sum, a reduction, but not an elimination of the inher-
ent selectivity of organizational action patterns is feasible.
This creates a risk of failure if environments change unex-
pectedly and blind spots become suddenly relevant. The same
argument holds for uncertainty emanating from environmen-
tal complexity which ends up in simpliﬁed organizational
action patterns and thus involves the same kind of risk. Taken
together, selectivity and simpliﬁcation are inevitable and a
necessary condition for organizational action but, likewise,
they potentially weaken the organization’s ability to sense
opportunities and threats (Teece, 2007) by impeding a sufﬁ-
cient degree of reﬂexivity.
Another important reason why organizational capabilities
can only partly be ﬂexible directly aims at these matters
of sense and identity. Accordingly, organizational capabili-
ties, as successful replication patterns, always involve the
dysfunctional ﬂipside of rigidity: In a case of environmental
change they may turn “from a strategic asset into a bur-
den” (Schreyögg & Kliesch-Eberl, 2007, p. 916). As Santos
and Eisenhardt (2005) point out, besides power and efﬁciency
considerations, competence deliberations and correspond-
ing resource allocation decisions, an organization’s boundaries
are signiﬁcantly shaped by its identity. Particularly relevant
in complex and uncertain environments, the identity rep-
resents a common ground of values and norms resulting
from collective sense-making processes (Daft & Weick, 1984).
Since identity involves emotional and unconscious compo-
nents it is hard to change. Instead, identity co-evolves with,
or even dominates, competence-based boundary demarcat-
ing practices (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). This goes along
with the idea of a self-referential and sense-processing sys-
tem that strives to maintain its self-constituting boundaries
– boundaries that are meaningful to the system. There-
fore they might not change offhand, instead organizational
core capabilities likewise represent potential core rigidi-
ties (Leonard-Barton, 1992). With regard to this paradox,
Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) refer to three well-known
major reasons why core capabilities might hamper organiza-
tional adaptation: (1) structural inertia (Hannan & Freeman,
1984) such as those inherent to existing organizational
resources and capabilities (e.g. Gilbert, 2005), (2) possible path-
dependencies and strategic lock-ins (e.g. Sydow, Schreyögg,
& Koch, 2009), as well as (3) past resource commitments
and their underlying social-psychological processes (e.g. Staw,
1976).
Basic insights from modern systems theory (Luhmann,
1995) contradict contemporary ﬂuidity concepts of organiza-
tions as argued by Schreyögg and Sydow (2010). This also
applies to the concept of dynamic capabilities: If one allows
for a limited organizational understanding of a seemingly
endless environment, one inevitably allows for selectivity,
simpliﬁcation, and uncertainty in organizational action which
leads to the possibility of failure. If one allows for sense and
identity one inevitably allows for rigidity inherent to organi-
zational action patterns. Thus, organizational capabilities are
only partly ﬂexible. An overarching organizational capability
that enables continuous adaptation to whatever kinds of envi-
ronmental changes, like an everlasting fountain of youth, is
therefore impossible to exist from a systems theoretic per-
spective. o w l e d g e 1 (2 0 1 6) 109–116
Empirical  consequences
As mentioned above, the ‘dynamic’ preﬁx of the dynamic
capabilities concept can only imply an implicit or explicit tau-
tological notion (group 1) since alternative deﬁnitions (groups
2 and 3) miss the very intent of the concept. As the former
do not allow for other explanations of competitive advan-
tage they are hardly empirically supportable. For example, it
could be possible that the continuous adaption to environ-
mental changes in the given period of investigation did not
require the illumination of competitive blind spots. Therefore,
they had no effect. Adaptations that do not touch exist-
ing blind spots bring luck and coincidence into play. They
do not indicate a dynamic capability (Helfat et al., 2007;
Winter, 2003). Although acknowledged within other ﬁelds (see
Williamson, 1975; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1986; Woo,
Daellenbach, & Nicholls-Nixon, 1994) literature on dynamic
capabilities largely neglects the role of luck and coincidence so
far (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). Competitive blind spots are
basically only partly assessable through an ex post rationaliza-
tion or through second-order observations (Luhmann, 1995).
Respective studies typically compare perceptions of competi-
tors (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) or of stakeholders with those
of the focal ﬁrm (Ng et al., 2009). In turn, a valid observa-
tion of a dynamic capability has to rule out the existence of
competitive blind spots as a rival explanation unequivocally.
In other words, a dynamic capability needs an unambiguous
causal link to ﬁrm success in empirical research (Ambrosini
& Bowman, 2009). Apart from such ‘success stories’, what
happens if a formerly successful organization, that arguably
possessed a dynamic capability, suffers a serious crises?
Accordingly, the ﬁrm might have ‘lost’ their dynamic capa-
bility or, alternatively, a blind spot may have become relevant,
which might be ‘bad luck’. Whatever applies: Proving a causal
relationship is essential to avoid tautological statements and
to demonstrate the validity of a theory in this respect. However
Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) argue that it is hard to show
that the construct of dynamic capabilities is causally respon-
sible for organizational success or for organizational resource
allocations. Hence, time lags between deployment and out-
come as well as complexity and uncertainty emanating from
the organization’s internal and external environment make it
hard to make casual assertions.
This study’s understanding of organizational capabilities
rather builds on the work of Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007)
and involves the dysfunctional ﬂipside of rigidity. Therefore,
this study assumes relative capability dynamization or adapt-
ability, instead of implicitly accepting their total ﬂexibility as
a matter of fact. Consequently, this study derives an under-
standing of organizational capabilities whereby the concept of
dynamic capabilities represents an ideal end of a continuum
rather than an empirically observable phenomenon.
A  reconceptualization  of  dynamic  capabilities
The rejection of total ﬂexibility as the conceptual core ofalternative understanding. In view of the profound theoretical
doubt that directly results in serious empirical complica-
tions, this study does not treat a dynamic capability as an
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mpirical phenomenon. Instead the notion of dynamic capa-
ilities should rather represent an ideal end of a continuum.
he underlying dimension of this continuum describes the
xtent of potential capability dynamization or the degree of
heir adaptability, respectively. The opposite end represents
he ﬁeld of population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984)
ith its heavy emphasis on rigidities and inertia, whereby the
anagement possesses only minimal discretion to adapt to
nvironmental changes. Modern systems theory thereby lies
n between as this article indicates. Such a continuum opens
he door for a discussion between formerly isolated conver-
ations and theories and allows for the empirical testing of
ultiple theoretical assumptions. Hopefully, this result in an
nriched and comprehensive understanding of how and to
hich extent organizational might change or not.
mplications  and  conclusion
his study outlines major shortcomings of existing conceptu-
lizations in dynamic capability research. It emphasizes the
rade-off between being tautological by involving an outcome
omponent (group 1) and being vague and arbitrary (group 2).
oreover, this study discusses problems of deﬁnitions involv-
ng ‘purpose’ to replace the outcome component (group 3).
owever, in order to provide a theoretical surplus the concept
f dynamic must involve a tautological notion, be it explicitly
r implicitly. Elsewise, the term ‘dynamic’ is not justiﬁed as
t becomes either obsolete or meaningless. The resolution of
his tautology trap by empirically proving a causal relation-
hip to organizational success is hardly possible. This led to
he development of an alternative understanding in which
ynamic capabilities are not an empirical phenomenon but
n ideal state at the end of a continuum. This allows for alter-
ative views on organizational capabilities such as modern
ystems theory.
A systems theoretic view on organizational capabilities
n high-velocity environments results in the insight that
ynamic capabilities might not fully be achievable. A social
ystem is self-referential and sense-processing in its very
ature. Furthermore, it operates in an environment it can-
ot fully understand. On one hand, this leads to selectivity
nd simpliﬁcation in organizational action patterns and hence
o blind spots and uncertainty in every kind of strategic
ction. This potentially constrains organizational discretion
or adaption. On the other hand, collective sense and iden-
ity might be hard to change. Finally, our argumentation
upports the view that organizational capabilities are only
artly ﬂexible. As the resulting insight, an overarching capa-
ility that allows for continuous adaptation to every kind
f environmental change cannot exist from a systems theo-
etic perspective. Rather, this study proposes to conceptualize
rganizational capabilities with respect to their potential
daptability/dynamization on a continuum while not assum-
ng their total ﬂexibility as a matter of fact. This paper
herefore supports the development of an alternative systems
heoretic understanding of organizational capabilities that
oes beyond the dynamic capability perspective. The capabil-
ty literature beneﬁts from with a more  balanced application
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